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I. INTRODUCTION
Until June 1990,' some medical device manufacturers risked being sued
for patent infringement by the patent holder when they collected pre-
marketing data as required by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
prior to the expiration of the patent. In 1984, drug manufacturers were
expressly exempted from similar patent infringement lawsuits by the
Patent Term Restoration Act (PTR Act of 1984 or DPC-PTR Act of 1984)
which was signed into law by President Reagan.2 Among the provisions
of that Act, Congress amended 35 USC § 271 by adding a new section 35
USC § 271(e). This new section contains language which provides that
"[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a patented
Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2683 (1990).
2The Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess., 98 Stat. 1585 (1986).
OVERVIEW OF THE PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984:
Title I of the PTR Act of 1984 contains section 101 of the Act. Section 101 of
the PTR Act of 1984 amends section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (21 USC § 355) which provides for submission of ANDAs (see infra note 47)
and paper NDAs.
Title II of the PTR Act of 1984 contains sections 201 and 202. Section 201 of
the Act contains section 156 which provides for the extension of a patent term.
Section 202 of the Act amends 35 USC § 271 by adding section 271(e)(1) which
provides for the infringement exemption to section 271(a).
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invention ... solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the man-
ufacture, use, or sale of drugs." The purpose of § 271(e)(1) is to permit
competitors to engage in data gathering activities solely for the devel-
opment and submission of information to a Federal agency prior to the
expiration of a patent. Without the existence of 35 USC § 271(e)(1), such
data gathering activities conducted prior to the expiration of a relevant
patent would constitute patent infringement under 35 USC § 271(a).
Section 271(a) states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this title,
whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention,
within the United States during the term of the patent therefor, infringes
the patent." Activity undertaken without authority or license from the
patentee which involves the use of a patented drug, for commercial pur-
poses, prior to the expiration of the patent term was considered patent
infringement under 35 USC § 271(a) before the enactment of 35 USC §
271(e)(1). This was the precise conclusion reached by the courts in Pfizer
v. International Rectifier3 and Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals,4
both of which were decided before the PTR Act of 1984 was signed into
law. It was widely believed that the infringement exemption provided for
in 35 USC § 271(e)(1) applied specifically to drugs (SECTION 101 OF THE
PTR ACT OF 1984, infra) especially since the language in 35 USC §
271(e)(1) refers expressly to "the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs."
However, the scope of this new provision assumes a new dimension in
view of the recent Supreme Court decision in Lilly v. Medtronics5 which
held that the infringement exemption of 35 USC § 271(e)(1) applies not
only to drugs but to medical devices as well.
This article undertakes to examine, critically, the case history, legis-
lative history, and the construction of sections 101, 201, and 2026 of the
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 in an effort to analyze the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Lilly v. Medtronics and to discern how the scope
of § 271(e)(1) is likely to be treated in future cases in light of that recent
Supreme Court decision.
II. CASES PRECEDING PASSAGE OF THE PTR ACT OF 1984
Analysis of the interpretation by the federal courts of 35 USC § 271(e)(1)
begins with the decisions that immediately preceded passage of the PTR
Act of 1984 containing the provisions of 35 USC § 271(e)(1), starting with
Pfizer v. International Rectifier. Prior to the passage of the PTR Act of
3 Pfizer v. International Rectifier, 217 USPQ 157 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
'Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
See supra note 1.See supra note 2.
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1984, a party alleged to have violated 35 USC § 271(a) could defend itself
by showing that its alleged activity constituted a common law experi-
mental use7 infringement exemption to 35 USC § 271(a). In Pfizer, the
court held that for activity to be classified as an experimental use common
law exemption applicable to alleged infringing activity under 35 USC §
271(a), the activity must not be related to any commercial use. In Pfizer,
the respondent, International Rectifier, contended that in making and
using doxycycline, a patented Pfizer product, it was engaging in collecting
premarketing data for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and,
therefore, making a common law experimental use of the drug exempted
from infringement liability under 35 USC § 271(a). The district court did
not accept this defense and ruled in favor of the patentee.
Following Pfizer, Bolar was decided on similar grounds. There, prior
to the patent expiration, the defendant generic drug company engaged
in obtaining FDA premarketing approval of the generic form of Roche's
patented product, Dalmane. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC) held that the use of the patented drug, prior to the expiration of
the Dalmane patent, solely for development and submission of data to
the FDA for obtaining premarketing approval was an act of infringement.
In so holding, the CAFC overruled the decision of the district court and
stated that Bolar's activities in seeking FDA approval of its generic ver-
sion of Dalmane, prior to expiration of the relevant patent, constituted
patent infringement pursuant to 35 USC § 271(a). It should be noted that
Bolar did not engage in selling the generic equivalent of Dalmane to the
consumer during the patent term of that product. Within the framework
of the PTR Act of 1984, Congress, thereafter, passed § 271(e)(1) specifically
overruling the Bolar decision.9
7 "[Tihe underlying rule of permissible experimental use demands there must
be intended commercial use of the patented article, none whatsoever, .... To
constitute an infringement, the making must be with an intent to use for profit,
and not for the mere purpose of a philosophical experiment." Pfizer, Inc. v. In-
ternational Rectifier, 217 USPQ 157,161 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
8 Id.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated that "[t]he district court
correctly recognized that the issue in this case is narrow: does the limited use of
a patented drug for testing and investigation strictly related to FDA drug approval
requirements during the last 6 months of the term of the patent constitute a use
which, unless, licensed, the patent statute [35 USC § 271(a)] makes actionable?
The district court held that it does not. This was an error of law." Roche Products,
Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858, 861, 221 USPQ 937, 939
(Fed. Cir. 1984). The language of 35 USC § 271(e)(1) permits the conduct which
was specifically prohibited by the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in Bolar. The language of 35 USC § 271(e)(1) states: "It shall not be an
act of infringement to make, use, or sell a patented invention ... solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use or sale of drugs."
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III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF § 271(E)(1)
A. Senate - Introduction of the Bill
On January 27, 1981 Senators Mathias, Byrd, Thurmond, Percy, and
Deconcini introduced Senate Bill 255 (S. 255)10 on the floor of the Senate.
The stated objective of the bill was "to amend the patent law to restore
the term of the patent grant for the period of time that non-patent reg-
ulatory requirements prevent the marketing of the patented product
10 Legislative History (in Chronological Order) of the Passage of the Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984:
DATE ACTION DILL SENATOR/REPRESENTATIVE CONGRP COMMEN
1979 introduced HR3S89 Symes
1980 introduced S2892 Bayh. Thurmood Mathias. 96th
Morgan. Pery
1980 introduced HR7952 Kasteonscier. Sawyer
1-27-81 introduced S255 Mathias. others S255 is similar
REPORTED OLT S255
PASSED S255
introduced HR137
Senate Judiciary Comm.
Only in Senate
Kastenmeer. Sayer
to 96th Congress'
S2892
S. Rpt. 97-138 Recommended
passage
HR6444 Kastenmeier Suhomm.
7-2082 Pfier v. Intl. Rectifier
REPORTED OUT HR6444
FAILED HR6444
introduced S1306
6-23-83 introduced
6-30-83 introduced
7-19-83 introduced
10-11-83 Roche v. Bolar
House Judiciary Comm.
In House of Represent.
Mathias
H. Rpt. 97-6%
S1538
HR3502 Synar. others
HR32605 Waxman
Essentially the same
as S255: the House
version
HR6444 is a clean
version of HR1937
and is related to
S255
Held commercial
tie of drug to
amount to patent
infringement under
35 USC § 271(a)
Said defeated due to
Waxnman's efforts
Essentially the same
as the 1981 version
of S255 that passed
in the Senate
Essentially the same
as the 1981 version
of S255 that passed
in the Senate
District court held
the use of the drug
as non-infringng
under 35 USC §
271(a)
6-16-81
7-9-81
1981
5-20-82 introduced
8-4-82
9-15-82
5-17-83
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.... "I This bill was referred to as the Patent Term Restoration Act of
1981.
Senator Mathias introduced this bill to address the concerns of several
Congressmen which were subsequently printed in the accompanying Sen-
4-23-84 Roch Y. lar
4-26-84 introduced
ILL SENATORREPRESENTATIVE CONGRE
HRS529 Kastenaeier Deten¢, Gliekman
5.24-85 amended HR3605 Wasman
6-12-84 introduced S2748 Hatch, Mathia, DeConcinL Kennedy
6-21.84 REPORTED OUT HR3605 House Energy & Commerce Comm
6-29-84 PASSED
H. RpL 98-857
Part I
S1538 Only in Senate
8-1-84 REPORTED OUT HR365 House Judiciary Comm.
8-9-84 introduced
8-10-84 PASSED
H. Rpt. 98-857
Part II
S2926
52926 Only in Senate
9-6-84 PASSED HJ3605 Only in House Amended vecion of
HR3605 passes in
the House: House
then amends S1538
to conform to the
passed versions of
HR3605 & S2926
and sends bill S1538
Lo Senate for vote
9-12-84 PASSED S1538 In Senate as well Senate accepts
House's
amendments to
S1538 to conform to
paused version of
HR3605 and passes
S1538; Bill goes to
President to sign
9-2444 BECOMES LAW PTR Act President Ronald Reagan Legislation passed
and signed into law
and known as the
PTR Act of 1984
11 127 CONG. REC. S674 (daily ed. January 27, 1981) (statement of Sen. Ma-
thias).
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CAFC held use of
the drug as
infringing under 35
USC J 271(a);
Reverscd the district
court's holding;
agreed with the
holding in Pfiger
Agricultural Patent
Term Reform Act.
addressed
agrochemicl patent
extensions
Deleted
agrochemicals from
th. bill; amended
HR3605
Essentially the same
as the House
version of HR3605
An amended version
of S1538 passed in
the senate
Senate rersion of
HR3605 as amended
and reported out
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ate Report of the Judiciary Committee. 12 The 17-year duration13 of a
patent is designed to give the patent holder market exclusivity on that
patent for the full 17 years. However, some patented products require
regulatory review and marketing approval by a federal agency before
such products may be sold to the public. Obtaining marketing approval
delays the introduction of these products into the marketplace. Generally,
manufacturers obtain patents for their products before seeking marketing
approval. Thus, to determine the period of actual market exclusivity
afforded a federally regulated product one must deduct from the 17-year
term of a patent the time spent in obtaining premarketing approval. In
effect, compliance with premarketing federal regulations results in sub-
stantially reducing the effective patent life14 of a patented product. Ac-
cording to the Judiciary Committee's report on the Patent Term Resto-
ration Act of 1981, the effective patent term of premarketing regulated
products has gone below 10 years. 15
B. Judiciary Committee Report - Public Policy Considerations
In 1861, Congress selected a 17-year life for a patent.18 The purpose of
the patent was to "[provide] an incentive for the costly and lengthy work
of developing an invention by giving the inventor a sufficient opportunity
to market a new product exclusively."17 The incentive to invest is greater
for a patent whose life of market exclusivity is closer to 17 years than to
10 years or less.
Industries that have high research and development (R&D) costs are
hardest hit by a reduction in the incentive to invent. Among these are
the manufacturers of drugs and medical devices. It is estimated that
12 S. REP. No. 138, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1981).; See supra note 10.
13 See infra note 16.
""The 'effective patent life' of a drug is measured from the date of FDA ap-
proval of the NDA (See infra note 47) to the date of expiration of the patent."
Flannery & Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent Protection in the Drug In-
dustry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 40
FOOD DRUG COSM. L. J. 269, 301 (1985).
15 S. REP. No., supra note 12, at 6. "Today, the process of getting a new medi-
cation approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has become so
complex that, on the average, almost half of the patent life of a drug now expires
before the product can be put on the market." 127 CONG. REC. S7355 (daily ed.
July 9,1981) (statement of Sen. Percy); "Academic studies (Eisman and Wardell,
Research Management 21(1),18-21 (1981) and others) had shown that the effective
patent life for pharmaceutical products had declined sharply in recent years. They
concluded that, from 1966 to 1979, effective patent life had fallen from 13.6 years
to 9.5 years." Alan D. Lourie, Patent Term Restoration, 66 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y. 526,
527 (1984); "A recent study indicated that it now can take on average from 7 to
10 years for a pharmaceutical company to satisfy the current regulatory require-
ments .... Because most FDA-required testing is done after a patent issues, the
remaining effective life of patent protection asserted may be as low as 7 years."
Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 221 USPQ 937,941 (1984).
"I S. REP. No. 138, supra note 12, at 6. Act of March 2, 1861, Ch. 88 § 16,12
Stat. 246.
11 S. REP. No. 138, supra note 12, at 6.
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"[between] 1954 and 1975, R&D expenditures in the U.S. drug industry
went from 90 million to 420 million."'18 It is noted that "[t]he erosion of
the patent term has been most severe on some industries whose inno-
vations provide important benefits to society. For example, society has
the strongest interest in encouraging the development of new and im-
proved drug therapies, [and] more effective medical devices .... ."19 The
result of this erosion of the effective patent life and the high cost of R&D
has been to decrease "the average number of new chemical entities dis-
covered and introduced in the country each year, . .. from 20 [in 1954]
to 10 [in 1975]."20 It is pertinent to note that while total R&D expenditures
has increased, the resultant development of marketed products has
sharply decreased.
The problem of a decreased patent life is compounded by the realities
of R&D. For example,
Nearly 90 percent of the drug candidates studied in humans
[became research 'deadends' and] were dropped prior to the
submission of a marketing application to [the Food and Drug
Administration.] An analysis of 1029 new chemical entities
submitted [for] testing between 1963-75 showed that only 59,
or six percent of the total, were eventually marketed. 21 The
annual growth rate for pharmaceutical R&D activities in
America from 1973-1979 was 11 percent, as compared to 25
percent in the United Kingdom, 20 percent in Germany, and
22 percent in Japan.22
The Judiciary Committee's report on S. 25523 stated that the Committee
was "particularly disturbed by the declining position of the U.S. industry
in the international field of pharmaceutical research" and that it was
"urgent to remove the handicap of reduced patent protection. .".. 24 The
Judiciary Committee concluded that "S. 255 will provide added cash flow
18 Id.; "With less chance to earn back their initial investment,-it cost an
average of $80 million to develop a new drug in 1979 compared to $6 million in
1962-pharmaceutical companies are less motivated to invest in research and
drug development and increasingly inclined to shift to non-drug products." 127
CONG. REc. S7355 (daily ed. July 9, 1981) (statement of Sen. Percy); "In 1962, for
example, it took approximately 2 years and $6 million (or $15 million in 1979)
to bring a new medicine from the laboratory to the marketplace. It now takes,
on average, 7 to 10 years and about $70 million to complete this testing period
"127 CONG. REc. S674 (daily ed. January 27, 1981) (statement of Sen. Mathias).
'IS. REP. No. 138, 13.7b.4.2a, supra note 12, at 6.
20 See id. at 7; "For example, from 1955 through 1962, an average of 46 new
drugs were introduced annually in the United States; today that average is only
17 new drugs a year, a decline of 63 percent." 127 CONG. REC. S674 (daily ed.
January 27, 1981) (statement of Sen. Mathias).
21 S. REP. No. 138, supra note 12, at 6-7. "On the average, scientists now screen
more than 10,000 possibilities for every one new medication that is eventually
approved by the FDA and put on the market." 127 CONG. REc. S7355-56 (daily
ed. July 9, 1981) (statement of Sen. Percy).
22 S. REP. No. 138, supra note 12, at 7.
mId. at 6; see supra note 10.
2 See supra note 22.
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to finance the costly future research efforts ... [and] ... it will increase
the expected return from new drug innovations, thereby, providing both
the incentive and the economic capability to conduct expensive long-term
research and development. '25 Notably, a firm cannot be expected to invest
in expensive long-term R&D unless the firm expects to recover the in-
vestment in the future years on the expectation of a patent and the
ensuing market exclusivity granted by that patent. If the duration of
market exclusivity is eroded by the premarketing regulatory process, then
the incentive to invest in R&D is, at least, proportionately diminished.
As proposed by S. 255, increasing the effective patent life would gen-
erate additional funds crucially needed by the small research oriented
firms. With these funds the smaller companies have the opportunity to
invest in R&D which is otherwise prohibitively expensive. The result is
that greater competition from the smaller firms is promoted.26 The pro-
posed legislation would also benefit teaching institutions such as uni-
versities, where most of the country's fundamental research is conducted,
which "find it difficult to license their inventions because of their short-
ened patent lives." 27 The Committee stated that it had a "strong interest
in the responsibilities of the pharmaceutical industry for pursuing and
manufacturing drugs to treat relatively rare diseases, which can antic-
ipate only a limited market.128 With regard to generic drugs, the Com-
mittee concluded that even though the proposed patent term restoration
(S.255) will primarily cause a delay in the copying of drugs which can be
produced and sold at lower prices, the innovation of a greater number of
pioneering drugs will eventually become a source of greater income for
the generic drug industry. Presumably, the incentive to invest in R&D
due to patent term restoration would have lead to the marketing of a
larger number of pioneer drugs which otherwise would not have been
developed and marketed. In turn, these undeveloped pioneer drugs would
not have been available for copying by the generic drug manufacturers.
The problem that was to be corrected by the proposed legislation in S.
255 was to counteract the effect of the
[I]ncreasing number of laws passed by the Congress to insure
that new products are safe for the public to use. Unfortunately,
the time required for this testing runs against the 17-year life
of a patent. [Though] [tihese tests are unrelated to the [granting
of a] patent, [they] severely limit the time available to market
the product. 2
25 Id.
28 See id. at 8; "This inequity hits small innovative businesses especially hard.
They need the protection that a patent offers in order to protect their new ideas
and innovations. These companies cannot afford to lose valuable years of patent
coverage while awaiting premarket clearances from Federal regulatory agencies.
It has been well documented that small businesses are the most innovative seg-
ment of our economy and the most dependable source of new jobs for our workers."
127 CONG. REC. S674 (daily ed. January 27, 1981) (statement of Sen. Mathias).
27 S. REP. No. 138, supra note 12, at 8.
28 See id. at 9.
127 CONG. REC. S675 (daily ed. January 27, 1981) (statement of Sen. Thur-
mond).
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On July 9, 1981 the Senate passed S. 255.10
C. House of Representatives - Amendments to the Bill
The House of Representatives introduced a bill substantially the same
as S. 255 referred to as H.R 1937.31 However, there was much opposition
to H.R 1937 in the House.32 After making changes to H.R. 1937, the bill
was introduced as a "clean" version in H.R 6444 on May 20, 1982.1- This
legislative effort, known as the Patent Term Restoration Act of 1982, was
defeated in the 97th Congress in the House.3 4 The Patent Term Resto-
ration Act of 1981 (S. 255) failed to pass in the House when it was voted
on under the designation of H.R. 6444.A5 The failure to pass this legislation
has been attributed to Representative Henry Waxman 36 who was con-
cerned that any patent term restoration would have to accommodate the
interests of the generic drug manufacturers.37
A compromise was reached between the research based drug industry,
represented by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer's Association (PMA),
and the members of the generic drug industry, represented by the Generic
Pharmaceutical Industry Association (GPIA). The details of the negoti-
ations between the PMA and the GPIA are published elsewhere .3 From
the compromise between the PMA and the GPIA, new legislation, known
as H R. 3605, was introduced in the House on July 19, 198339 and referred
to the Judiciary Committee. 40 This bill eventually became the Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984. The main purpose of the referral was to
obtain authorization from the Judiciary Committee for amendments made
to section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) au-
thorizing use of abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs 41) for generic
drugs of previously approved pioneer drugs. The committee report,42 re-
30 Alan D. Lourie, Patent Term Restoration: History, Summary, and Appraisal,
40 FoOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 351,353 (1985).
311d.; see also supra note 10.
32 Lourie, supra note 30, at 353. "In the House, Congressmen Kastenmeier and
Sawyer introduced H.R. 1937, essentially the same as S. 255. By this time, how-
ever, substantial opposition to the bill had emerged from groups historically
antagonistic to the research-based drug industry, which had become the principal
focus of the bill. At hearings held by Kastenmeier subcommittee, generic drug
manufacturers, retired persons groups, and what are referred to as 'public interest'
groups testified against it." Lourie, supra note 15, at 530.
3 CIS/Annual 1884, Legislative Histories, January - December 1984 (CONG.
INFO. SERVICE, INC.) Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, Pub. L. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (98th Cong., 2nd Session), 279, 280.
34 Id.; see also supra note 10.
31 See supra note 10 which lists in table form the chronological legislative
history of the Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 beginning in 1979.316 Lourie, supra note 30, at 354; Lourie, supra note 15, at 533.
31 Lourie, supra note 30, at 354; Lourie, supra note 15, at 533.
31 Lourie, supra note 30, at 355.
39 Flannery & Hutt, supra note 14, at 271; Lourie, supra note 15, at 533.
40 See supra note 10.
41 See infra note 47.
42 H.R. REP. No. 857, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt.II (1984).
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garding H.R. 3605, approved the proposed bill. This bill was revised to a
large extent and introduced as S. 2748 in the Senate on June 12, 1984.43
The House Committee on Energy and Commerce made its report on June
21, 1984.
44
D. Major Differences Between the Several Amended Versions
There were several major differences among the provisions proposed
in S. 255, H.R. 1937, H.R. 6444 and S. 2748. The legislation known as
the Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981 (S. 255 and H.R. 1937) and the
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1982 (H.R 6444), in effect, provided the
members of the PMA with a patent extension provision for a maximum
duration of seven additional years 45 without any regard for the interests
of the members of the GPIA. In contrast, the Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984 (S. 2748, S. 2926, S. 1538 and H.R. 3605) provided members
of the PMA with a maximum possible patent extension of seven and a
half years (5 years patent extension plus 30 months46) while providing
for an expedited method of approving generic drugs through the use of
abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs)47 and paper new drug ap-
- Flannery & Hutt, supra note 14, at 271.
"Flannery & Hutt, supra note 14, at 271.
-"The purpose of the present bill is to restore to products subject to premarket
review requirements a period equal to the time required for this clearance-up
to a maximum of 7 years." 127 CONG. REC. S674 (daily ed. January 27, 1981)
(statement of Sen. Mathias).
46 Lourie, supra note 15, at 548; "[Elven though an ANDA containing a cert-
ification of patent invalidity or noninfringement [§ 505(j)(2)(A)(vii)(lV) of the
FDCA] may be submitted to FDA ... permitting the patent litigation to begin
at that time, the legislation provides a further period during which the generic
version may not be marketed if the patent owner initiates litigation. Thus, the
ANDA may not be made effective by FDA for a total of seven and a half years
after the approval of the pioneer NDA if litigation is brought, unless the court
holds the patent invalid or not infringed at an earlier date." Flannery & Hutt,
supra note 14, at 289.
41 "The FD&C Act, [Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic], requires every person
who wishes to market a new drug to submit a new drug application (NDA) dem-
onstrating the safety and effectiveness of the drug. FDA [Food and Drug Admin-
istration] must approve the NDA before the drug may be marketed. A 'full NDA'
contains all of the required animal and human proof of safety and effectiveness,
through studies conducted by or for the applicant or for which the applicant has
obtained a right of reference or use from the person by or for whom the studies
were conducted. A new drug for which a full NDA is submitted to FDA is called
a 'pioneer new drug' or 'pioneer drug' (or, under the DPC-PTR Act, a 'listed' drug).
An NDA for such a drug is called a 'pioneer NDA' or a 'full NDA,' and the person
who submits that application is called the 'pioneer applicant.' In contrast, a new
drug for which approval is sought on the basis that it is equivalent to a previously
approved pioneer new drug, and for which no animal and human studies on safety
and effectiveness are independently conducted, is called a 'generic drug.' An NDA
for a generic drug is called an 'abbreviated NDA (ANDA),' a 'paper NDA,' or a
'generic application,' and the person who submits it is called a 'generic applicant.' "
(Emphasis added.) Flannery & Hutt, supra note 14, at 272. "[I]n 1980, FDA
adopted a 'paper NDA' policy for generic copies of all pioneer new drugs, whether
[Vol. 6:2
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plications (paper NDAs).48
In addition, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984 (PTR Act of 1984 or DPC-PTR Act of 1984) provided for testing
of generic drugs using the patented drug solely for the purpose of pro-
viding data to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) prior to the
expiration of the patent on the pioneer drug.49 The provision of the PTR
Act of 1984 allowing for comparison testing between a generic and a
patented drug prior to the expiration of the patent is embodied in Title
II, section 202 of the Act. "Section 202 of the Act amends section 271 of
the patent law (35 U.S.C.) to add a new subsection, [35 USC § 271(e)],
establishing the circumstances under which use of a patented human
drug is and is not an infringement of a valid unexpired patent."50 Fur-
thermore, S. 2748 was changed in other respects limiting conditions under
which an ANDA could be approved by the FDA51 and a clean bill, S. 2926,
was introduced in the Senate on August 9, 1984 and passed by the Senate
on August 10, 1984.52
E. Final Passage of the PTR Act of 1984
"When S. 2926 was received by the House, Representative Henry Wax-
man, the House sponsor, took up the House version, H.R. 3605, brought
it into conformity with the Senate bill, with a few minor additional
amendments, and substituted H.R. 3605 for the text of S. 1538."63 S. 1538
was the successor of S. 2926 and the same as H.R. 3605. H.R. 3605 was
passed by the House on September 6, 1984.54 On September 12, 1984 the
Senate agreed to the House amendments and passed S. 1538 and President
pre-1962 or post-1962. Under this policy, any information on safety or effective-
ness published in the scientific literature could be relied upon by a generic man-
ufacturer in submitting any form of an NDA for a generic copy of a pioneer new
drug." Id. at 275. "A paper NDA is a full NDA and must satisfy all of the same
requirements as a pioneer NDA, but may satisfy those requirements in the form
of summaries from published literature of studies done by others rather than
through the reports of studies sponsored by the applicant. The difference between
a paper NDA and an ANDA is that a paper NDA relies on published literature
for all of the same animal and human data that are contained in a pioneer NDA,
whereas an ANDA includes no literature or other reports of safety and effective-
ness and instead relies only upon bioavailability and bioequivalence data." Id. at
277. "Accordingly, the statute recognizes two different but closely related types
of approval mechanisms for generic drugs-ANDAs and paper NDAs. An ANDA
is an NDA which substitutes bioavailability and bioequivalence data for full
animal and human studies of safety and effectiveness (which studies are required
in a full NDA). A paper NDA encloses published literature to satisfy the require-
ment for animal and human studies demonstrating safety and effectiveness." Id.
at 296.
Id. at 272, 275, 277.
49 Id. at 272.
0 Id. at 307; see also supra note 2.
-5 Lourie, supra note 15, at 544.
52 Flannery & Hutt, supra note 14, at 287.
130 CONG. REc. 24977 (September 12, 1984).
CONG. REc. DAILY DIGEST D808 (December 12, 1984).
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Reagan signed the bill into law (PTR Act of 1984) on September 24, 1984.5-
F. Section 202 of the PTR Act of 1984
It is useful to consider in some detail the legislative history with specific
reference to section 202 of the PTR Act of 1984 which clarifies Congress'
intent underlying the passage of § 271(e)(1). Section 202 of the PTR Act
of 1984 introduced new legislation 35 USC § 271(e)(1), which reversed
the effect of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's (CAFC) decision
in Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals.5 The new subsection, (e)(1),17
was added to 35 USC § 271 which rendered it no longer an act of patent
infringement to engage in the use of pioneer drugs solely for the purpose
of submitting premarketing data to the FDA prior to the expiration of
the pioneer drug's patent life. Several Congressmen were concerned that
§ 271(e)(1) drastically altered the patent law with regard to infringement
in the drug industry. Congressman Moorehead of the House stated that
A particularly disturbing provision, [§ 271(e)(1)],. . . was main-
tained and I am concerned by its implications and conse-
quences, if enacted. Specifically, I refer to section 202 [of the
PTR Act of 1984] which would overrule the recent Federal
Court of Appeals decision in Roche v. Bolar. Enactment of this
section, [§ 271(e)(1)], would create an unprecedented
exception s to the exclusionary rights to which a patent holder
is entitled during the patent term. Overturning the Bolar de-
cision would allow experimental use of a drug product prior to
expiration of the patent. There is no legitimate basis for dis-
tinguishing between the exclusionary rights accorded a phar-
maceutical manufacturer during the patent term and those
enjoyed by any other holder .... For this reason, section 202
should be amended to permit experimental use of a drug by a
non-patentee only during the period for which the patent has
been extended. (Emphasis added.) 9
55 d.
16 See supra note 4.
11 "It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a patented
invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as
those terms are used in the Federal, Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act
of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA,
recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific
genetic manipulation techniques solely for the uses related to the development
and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manu-
facture, use or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products." (Emphasis added.)
35 USC § 271(e)(1) (as of November 16,1988). "It shall not be an act of infringement
to make, use, or sell a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or
veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913)) solely for uses reasonably related
to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which
regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs." 35 USC § 271(e)(1) (as of Sep-
tember 24, 1984).
11 What Congressman Moorehead refers to as the "exception" is consistent with
the meaning of the word "exemption" as used by the Supreme Court. (See infra
note 82).
5 130 CONG. REc. 24456-57 (September 6, 1984).
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Representative Coleman stated that
The bill, [PTR Act of 1984; H R. 3605], represents another step
toward free-market economics in the pharmaceutical industry,
and it provides easier entry into the marketplace for generic
substitutes of brand name drugs, which often enjoy long periods
of market exclusivity .... By providing rapid approval of ge-
neric drugs ... H.R. 3605 promised to save consumers ... $1
billion over the next decade. However, it quickly became ap-
parent that passage of H.R. 3605 was unlikely unless a com-
promise could be reached with major drug manufacturers.
Therefore, Chairman Waxman engaged in extensive negotia-
tions with representatives of the brand name [and] generic drug
companies in order to craft a workable compromise that would
satisfy all interested parties. 60
"The compromise that was fashioned provided for both faster approval
of generic drugs along with extended patent terms for companies that
developed pioneer drugs."'6 1 Senator Hatch stated that the PTR Act of
1984 "reconciles the opposing, competitive interests of two segments of
the pharmaceutical industry which have often stymied each other's at-
tempts to improve the law"62 Finally, Senator Metzenbaum stated that
[T]here are many people asking what this bill is all about...
Nobody can change the language of the, legislation. It speaks
for itself .... I want the courts to understand that the legis-
lation speaks for itself and the interpretation which anyone
may make on the floor does not really add anything to that
interpretation. 68
From the foregoing comments of Mr. Moorehead, Mr. Coleman, Mr. Hatch
and Mr. Metzenbaum, it appears that § 271(e)(1) was meant to reverse
the decision in Bolar and the language in § 271(e)(1) was meant to apply
specifically to drugs only. Senator Metzenbaum cautioned the court in
his statements that the language of the bill, which included the language
of § 271(e)(1), should be strictly adhered to and that any other interpre-
tation of the language would be contrary to the intent of Congress. Not
only do the comments of the quoted Congressmen support a narrow read-
ing of § 271(e)(1) but so do the public policy considerations articulated
by the Judiciary Committee when S. 255 was proposed. It should also be
noted that the compromise that led to the passage of PTR Act of 1984
was due to the compromises made between the PMA and the GPIA,
members of the pharmaceutical drug industry. However, as we will see,
the CAFC and the Supreme Court have not limited the application of §
271(e)(1) to drugs, but have also applied it to medical devices. 64
61 Id. at 24457.
61 Id.
6' 130 CONG. REc. 23764 (August 10, 1984).
6Id.
Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2683 (1990).
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IV. CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 101 OF THE PTR ACT OF 1984
Section 101 of the PTR Act of 1984 amends § 505 of the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 USC § 355; FDCA). By this amendment,
section 101 establishes expeditious procedures for obtaining premarketing
approval of generic drugs. Notably, the premarketing approval procedure,
by the provisions of section 101, may be initiated before the patent on
the pioneer drug expires. Provisions of the legislation allow the submis-
sion of an ANDA6 5 by a generic drug manufacturer prior to the expiration
of the patent term of the pioneer drug. Specifically, section 505 of the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 USC § 355; FDCA) was amended
by section 101 of the PTR Act of 1984 by adding a new subsection j) to
section 505 of the FDCA and designating the old section (j) as (k). In
pertinent part, section 505()(2)(A) provides that
an abbreviated application for a new drug shall contain-
(iv) information to show that the new drug is bioequivalent to
the listed [pioneer] drug ...
(vii) a certification, in the opinion of the applicant and to the
best of his knowledge, with respect to each patent which claims
the listed [pioneer] drug ... for which the [generic drug] ap-
plicant is seeking approval under this subsection and for which
information is required to be filed... -
(I) that such patent information is not filed,
(II) that such patent has expired,
(III) of the date on which such patent will expire, or
(IV) that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new [generic] drug for which
the application is submitted; ... (Emphasis added.)
Clearly, the language of section 505 of the FDCA, namely, section
505(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III) which states "(III) of the date on which such patent
will expire" undoubtedly recognizes the submission of an ANDA appli-
cation to the FDA prior to the expiration of the patent term of a pioneer
drug. Insertion of section 505(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III) was the result of a com-
promise between the PMA and GPIA in that the FDA was precluded from
granting marketing approval for an ANDA which would become effective
before the patent on the pioneer drug had expired even though the ANDA
was submitted to the FDA prior to the expiration of the patent on the
pioneer drug.66 The conclusion is clear that one cannot submit an ANDA
prior to the expiration of the patent term as provided by
505(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III) of 21 USC § 355 (FDCA) and at the same time avoid
violating 35 USC § 271(a), in keeping with the decisions in Pfizer v.
International Rectifier and Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals, both
of which held that "use of a patented drug for federally mandated pre-
See supra note 47.
Flannery & Hutt, supra note 14, at 285.
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marketing tests"67 prior to the expiration of the patent term constitutes
patent infringement (35 USC § 271(a)). 8
In order to accommodate an ANDA filing pursuant to
505(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III), the decision in Bolar had to be reversed, making the
FDA required premarketing data gathering activities of generic compa-
nies, during the patent term of a pioneer drugs, non-infringing. To allow
a non-infringing ANDA filing prior to the expiration of the relevant pi-
oneer drug patent, section 202 of the PTR Act of 1984 contained the
language of 35 USC § 271(e)(1). The compromise between the PMA and
the GPIA, which was intended to reverse Bolar in the narrowest fashion
possible, but at the same time leave the patentee's market exclusivity
intact for the remaining term of the patent, resulted in 35 USC § 271(e)(1).
In effect, the language of 35 USC § 271(e)(1) "was to reverse Roche v.
Bolar, only to the extent that a company had no intent to commercialize
the invention before the patent expiration date."6 9
In the final version of the Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, a
patent's validity could be otherwise challenged when an ANDA was sub-
mitted to the FDA, under the FDCA § 505(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV), prior to ex-
piration of the patent term. Under this provision of § 505 (FDCA) the
ANDA was required to contain the statement "... that such patent is
invalid .... -70 Clearly, when a generic manufacturer intended to chal-
lenge the validity of a patent via an ANDA submitted under FDCA §
505(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV), the manufacturer could do so prior to the expiration
of the patent term. With the passage of section 101 of the PTR Act of
1984 adding the new language in § 505(j), the decision in Bolar could not
be preserved. Congress specifically accomplished the reversal of Bolar,
by passing 35 USC § 217(e)(1) contained in section 202 of the PTR Act
of 1984.
71
In a 1985 article published in the Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal,
the writers Flannery and Hutt stated:
New section 271(e)(1) is limited to human drug products, and
does not include medical devices, animal drugs, food additives,
color additives, or other related products. This provision, [35
USC § 271(e)(1)], overrules the decision in Roche Products v.
Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. which held that the testing of a pat-
ented drug to meet FDA requirements before the expiration of
a valid patent constitutes infringement. Because section
271(e)(1) was intended solely to overrule this judicial decision,
it is narrow in application. This statutory provision applies
only to a patented human drug product, not to any other in-
vention. 72
67 Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 733 F.2d 858, 860
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
" This is a critical point reiterated in the Conclusion, infra.
69 Lourie, supra note 15, at 541.
10 Federal Food Drug & Cosmetic Act § 505(j)(2)(A)(vii) (IV).
71 Laurie, supra note 15, at 543.
72 Flannery & Hutt, supra note 14, at 308; " Ms. Flannery is an associate and
Mr. Hutt is a partner with the law firm of Covington & Burlington, Washington,
D. C. Mr. Hutt represented the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association in the
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Another writer, Alan D. Lourie, states that
While loss of the Roche-Bolar doctrine ... greatly troubled
lawyers and industry executives, the fact is that until [the]
Pfizer International Rectifier case, there really was no clear
judicial precedent on the issue and generic companies often
formulated, tested, and submitted applications to the FDA dur-
ing the patent period with impunity. Thus, on the issue, the
law under the DPC-PTR Act 73 will be little different from what
it was three years before its passage.7 4
Finally, according to Steven J. Goldstein, "[t]he DPC-PTR Act presents
the anomalous situation that while the holding of Roche v. Bolar is re-
versed as to drugs, the implications of that case, as they relate to all
regulated compounds other than human drugs, still remain in effect. '75
V. CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 201 OF THE PTR ACT OF 1984
Section 201 of the PTR Act of 1984 provides for extension of a patent
term by adding new section 156 to Title 35 of the United States Code. In
pertinent part, 35 USC 156 states:
(a) The term of a patent which claims a product, a method of
using a product, or a method of manufacturing a product shall
be extended in accordance with this section from the original
expiration date of the patent if-
(1) the term of the patent has not expired before an appli-
cation is submitted under subsection (d) for its extension;
(2) the term of the patent has never been extended;
(3) an application for extension is submitted by the owner of
record of the patent or its agent and in accordance with the
requirements of subsection (d);
consideration of this legislation. He also served as a moderator at the Food and
Drug Law Institute's Briefing on the Drug Price Competition-Patent Term Res-
toration Act, Washington, D C. (Nov. 1984)." Id. at 269.
7 The abbreviation DPC-PTR Act of 1984 also refers to the Patent Term Res-
toration Act of 1984.
74 Lourie, supra note 30, at 361; "Dr. Lourie is Vice President, Corporate Pat-
ents and Trademarks, and Associate General Counsel, Smith Kline Beckman
Corporation. He presented this paper to the Food and Drug Law Institute's Brief-
ing on the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Washington D. C. (Nov. 1984). The views expressed [therein were] strictly those
of the author and are not to be attributed to any organization with which he is
associated." Id. at 351.
1- Steven J. Goldstein, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984 Title II Patent Extension Provisions, 40 FoOD, DRUG AND CosM. L. J.
363, 367 (1985); "Mr. Goldstein is Patent Counsel with The Procter & Gamble
Company, Cincinnati, Ohio. He delivered this paper to the Food and Drug Law
Institute's Briefing on the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984, Washington D. C. (Nov. 1984). The views expressed in [the submitted]
paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of The Procter
& Gamble Company." Id. at 363.
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(4) the product has been subject to a regulatory review period
before its commercial marketing or use;
(5)(A) except as provided in subparagraph (B), the permission
for the commercial marketing or use of the product after such
regulatory review period is the first permitted commercial mar-
keting or use of the product under the provision of law under
which such regulatory review period occurred;...
The product referred to in paragraphs (4) and (5) is herein-
after in the section referred to as the 'approved' product.
(b) The rights derived from any patent the term of which is
extended under this section shall during the period during
which the patent is extended-
(1) in the case of a patent which claims a product, be limited
to any use approved for the approved product before the ex-
piration of the term of the patent under the provision of law
under which the applicable regulatory review occurred;
(f) For purposes of this section:
(1) The term 'product' means:
(A) A human drug product.
(B) Any medical device, food additive, or color additive
subject to regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act.
(2) The term 'human drug product' means the active in-
gredient of a new drug, antibiotic drug, or human biological
product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act) in-
cluding any salt or ester of the active ingredient, as a single
entity or in combination with another active ingredient. 35
USC § 156.
Pursuant to § 156(f), products eligible for patent term extension are hu-
man drug products, medical devices, food additives, or color additives
subject to regulation under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA). In addition, the patent term extension provision is limited to
patents for their first permitted commercial marketing and only for uses
initially approved and associated with that marketing. 35 USC §
156(5)(A) and (b)(1). Subsequent new approved uses are not eligible for
patent term extension. 35 USC §§ 156 (a)(2) and (b)(1).
VI. LILLY V. MEDTRONIC
After passage of the PTR Act of 1984, Eli Lilly brought a patent in-
fringement action against Medtronic Inc. pursuant to 35 USC § 271(a)
in which Lilly alleged that Medtronic infringed two of Lilly's medical
device patents. Medtronic countered that since medical devices are reg-
ulated by the FDA, it was merely acting solely for presenting premar-
keting approval data to the FDA pursuant to 21 USC § 360 and 35 USC
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§ 271(e)(1). 76 The district court rejected Medtronic's defense and ruled
that 35 USC § 271(e)(1) applied only to drugs and not to medical devices.
The district court stated that "the statutory language of § 2 7 1(e)(1) and
the legislative history of the section support Lilly's contention that
§ 271 (e)(1) is inapplicable to medical devices."'77 Subsequently, the district
court granted Lilly's request for injunctive relief 8 against Medtronic.
Medtronic thereafter unsuccessfully attempted to invalidate the Lilly
patents .
79
Medtronic then sought an interlocutory appeal from the permanent
injunction 0 ordered by the district court. In its appeal to the CAFC,
Medtronic asserted that it did not violate 35 USC § 271(a) because its
conduct relating to medical devices was permitted under 35 USC
§ 271(e)(1). The CAFC held that "35 USC § 271(e)(1) applie[d] to any
manufacture, use or sale of any type of patented invention if used solely
for restricted purposes specified, and [was] not limited simply to drugs."''
However, the court remanded the case to the district court "because it
was unclear [which] of Medtronic's activities [fell] within the § 271(e)(1)
exception8 2 [and left] it for the [district court] on remand to decide to what
extent the injunction should be vacated, modified, or stayed during further
proceedings."8 3 Lilly requested a rehearing en banc which the CAFC de-
clined to grant, already having remanded the case. 4 On remand the
injunction against Medtronic was modified. 5
76Eli Lily and Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 5 USPQ 2d 1760 (E.D.Pa. 1987).
71 Id. at 1761.
71 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 5 USPQ 2d 1439 (E.D.Pa. 1988).
79 Medtronic alleged that the inventors of the Lilly patents, in question, had
engaged in inequitable conduct while the patents were being examined by the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and, therefore, the patents were unenforce-
able. The district court ruled in favor of Lilly stating that Medtronic had not
shown inequitable conduct on the part of the patent inventors and, therefore, the
patents in question were enforceable; Eli Lilly and Co v. Medtronic Inc., 696 F.
Supp. 1033 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
10 See supra note 78.
81 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 10 USPQ 2d 1304, (Fed. Cir. 1989).
12 The Supreme Court refers to 35 USC § 271(e)(1) as the infringement exemp-
tion to 35 USC § 271(a) and it refers to the language "other than a new animal
drug or veterinary biological product .. ." found in 35 USC § 271(e)(1) as the
exception to the coverage of 35 USC § 271(e)(1). What the CAFC calls a "§271(e)(1)
exception" is in its meaning consistent with the term exemption as used by the
Supreme Court.
Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
a4 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 879 F.2d 849, (Fed. Cir. 1989).
1On June 28,1989, the district court modified the injunction against Medtronic
pursuant to the decision of the CAFC. The modified injunction was geared against
only those activities of Medtronic which were not solely intended for purposes
permitted under 35 USC § 271(e)(1). Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 735 F.
Supp. 652, 663 (E. D. Pa 1990). Medtronic then brought an unfair competition
suit against Lilly which was unrelated to the interpretation of 35 USC § 271(e)(1).
Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 15 USPQ 2d 1465 (D. Minn. 1990). On February
22, 1990, the district court found Medtronic in contempt of court of its modified
injunction of June 28, 1989 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic Inc, 735 F. Supp. 652
(E. D. Pa. 1990).
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Lilly sought and was granted certiorari. 6 On June 18, 1990, the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CAFC ruling that 35 USC §
271(e)(1) applied to medical devices as well as to drugs. The court further
stated that whichever products were provided patent term extension un-
der section 201 (35 USC § 156(f)) of the PTR Act of 1984 were also covered
by the infringement exemption under section 202 (35 USC § 271(e)(1)) of
the PTR Act of 1984.87
The Supreme Court, in Lilly v. Medtronic, held that
[35 USC §] 271(e)(1) exempts from infringement the use of
patented inventions reasonably related to the development and
submission of information needed to obtain marketing approval
of medical devices under the FDCA, [the Federal Food Drug
and Cosmetic Act], [and that] [t]he statutory phrase of
§ 271(e)(1), 'a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,
use, or sale of drugs' is ambiguous. 88
The Court concluded that
The 1984 Act, [the PTR Act of 1984], was designed to remedy
two unintended distortions of the standard 17-year patent term
produced by the requirement that certain products receive pre-
market regulatory approval: (1) the patentee would as a prac-
tical matter not be able to reap any financial rewards during
the early years of the [patent] term while he was engaged in
seeking [FDA marketing] approval; and (2) the end of the term
would be effectively extended until [FDA marketing] approval
was obtained for competing inventions, since competitors could
not initiate the regulatory process until the term's expiration.8 9
The Court explained that
[S]ection 201 of the Act, [the PTR Act of 1984], sought to elim-
inate the former distortion, [in (1) above], by creating 35 USC
§ 156, which sets forth a patent-term extension for inventions
subject to a lengthy regulatory approval process 9° [and that]
[s]ction 202 of the Act addressed the latter distortion, [in (2)
above], by creating § 271(e)(1).91
The Court reached the conclusion that
[I]t is implausible that Congress ... should choose to address
both distortions, [(1) and (2) above], only for drug products, and
for other products named in § 201 should enact provisions,
[§ 271(e)(1)], which not only leave in place an anticompetitive
8
6 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 110 S. Ct. 232 (1989).
"I Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2683 (1990).
Id. at 2684.
Id.
SId.
91 Id.92 Id. at 2684-85.
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restriction at the end of the monopoly term, [by not applying
§ 271(e)(1) to medical devices], but simultaneously expanding
the term itself... [under section 201 of the PTR Act of 1984
and 35 USC § 156.92
The Court apparently reads the language,
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, or sell a
patented invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary
biological product (as those term are described in the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913))
solely for uses reasonably related to the development and sub-
mission of information under a Federal law which regulates
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs,
of 35 USC § 271(e)(1) to mean that it is an act of infringement for a non-
patent holder or an unlicensed user to make, use, or sell a new animal
drug or veterinary biological product during the patent term solely for
uses reasonably related to the submission and development of information
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs. (Emphasis added.) The Court then states that
[T]he fact that § 202, [which contains 35 USC § 271(e)(1)],
expressly excepts from its infringement exemption a new an-
imal drug or veterinary biological product-each of which is
subject to premarketing licensing and approval.., and neither
of which was included in § 201's patent term extension pro-
vision-indicates that §§ 201 and 202 are meant generally to
be complementary. (Emphasis added.) 93
In other words, the Court seems to have ruled that all products subject
to the patent term extension provisions under section 201 (35 USC § 156)
are exempted from patent infringement because those products are there-
fore also considered to be covered under section 202 (35 USC § 271(e)(1))
of the PTR Act of 1984. In essence, the Court is expanding the application
under section 202 of 35 USC § 271(e)(1) from drugs to all products, in-
cluding medical devices, which are eligible for patent term extension
under § 201 (35 USC § 156) of the PTR Act of 1984.
What the Court fails to address in its reasoning is that new animal
drugs or veterinary biological products were not included in sections 201
(35 USC § 156) and 202 (35 USC § 271(e)(1)) of the PTR Act of 1984
because prior to passage of that Act,
Congressmen Glickman (Kansas) and DeWine (Ohio) drafted
and introduced on April 26, 1984, H.R. 5529, the Agricultural
Patent Reform Act, in order to free the agrochemical industry
from the tangle in which the [P]atent [Tierm [R]estoration [Act
of 1984] had become enmeshed .... This bill was limited to
animal drugs and biologicals .... It was essentially [the same
as] the earlier Patent Term Restoration Act.9 4
91 Id. at 2685.
Lourie, supra note 15, at 540.
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"Agrochemicals were dropped [from the PTR Act of 1984] because of the
introduction of H.R. 5529." 95 Senator Waxman confirmed that
"[u]nfortunately, due to the complexities of the human drug bill, [the PTR
Act of 1984], we did not include animal drugs."9 6 It appears that the reason
§ 201 (35 USC § 156(f)) of the PTR Act of 1984 did not cover a new animal
drug or veterinary biological product was not, as the Court suggests, to
maintain any product-correlation between sections 201 and 202 of the
PTR Act of 1984, but simply because of the fears of the agrochemical
industry that the PTR Act of 1984 would never pass.
The Court's assertion of an intentional Congressional purpose to main-
tain a product-correlation between § 201 and § 202 of the PTR Act of
1984 is not substantiated. However, the Court acknowledges the weak-
ness in its product-correlation argument by stating in footnote 6
[Tihat the seemingly complete product correlation between
§ 201 and § 202 was destroyed in 1986, when, without adding
'new infant formula' to the defined products eligible for patent-
term extension under § 156 [§ 201 of the PTR Act of 1984],
Congress established a premarket approval requirement for
that product, and thus automatically rendered it eligible for
the § 271(e)(1) [§ 202 ofthe PTR Act of 1984] exemption from
patent infringement. 91
Lastly, the Court suggests further in footnote 6 that the
[I]solated indication of lack of correlation between § 156 [§ 201
of the PTR Act of 1984] and § 271(e)(1) [§ 202 of the PTR Act
of 1984] is in any event contradicted by the 1988 amendment,
[the Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1988], that added most new animal drugs and veterinary
biological products to § 156 and simultaneously deleted from
§ 271(e)(1) the infringement exception [see infra note 82] for
those products.9 8
The Court is indicating that Congress acknowledges its product- corre-
lation argument by enacting the 1988 Generic Animal Drug and Patent
Term Restoration Act (GAD-PTR Act of 1988), which permits patent-
extension for new animal drugs and veterinary biological products and
simultaneously includes these products in the infringement exemption
of § 271(e)(1). See infra note 57. What the Court fails to note is that the
manner in which federally regulated premarketing approval is accom-
plished for these animal products is by amending § 101 of the Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984 to include these animal products in § 505.
Moreover, § 505 of the FDCA dictates that the mechanism of regulatory
approval for animal products is through the use of an abbreviated new
- Id.
134 CONG. REC. H9785 (daily ed. October 6, 1988).
97 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2683, 2691, n.6 (1990).
98Id. at 2691, n.6.
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drug application (ANDA) essentially the same as for human drug prod-
ucts. From the construction of section 101 of the PTR Act of 1984, an
infringement exemption provision of § 271(e)(1) must cover all products
which are submitted prior to the expiration of the relevant patent for
premarketing regulatory approval, via an ANDA, as provided in § 101
of the PTR Act of 1984 under § 505(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III) of 21 USC § 355
(FDCA). Further, no product-correlation between § 156 (§ 201 of the PTR
Act of 1984) and § 271(e)(1) (§ 202 of the PTR Act of 1984) would have
been present had the method of federal premarketing approval for these
animal products been accomplished by means other than ANDAs essen-
tially the same as used for human drug products.99
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Lilly v. Medtronic'00 suggests a product-corre-
lation argument between sections 201 and 202 of the PTR Act of 1984.
In essence, the argument is that products eligible for patent term exten-
sion under § 201 (35 USC § 156) are also exempted from patent infringe-
ment insofar as activities are permitted under § 202 (35 USC
§ 271(e)(1)).101 At the same time the Court has stated that an "isolated
lack of correlation between § 156 and § 271(e)(1)" 02 "does not change [its]
o COMPARISON OF THE PTR ACT OF 1984 AND THE GAD-PTR ACT OF 1988:
The language of section 101 of the PTR Act of 1984 is literally identical to thelanguage employed in section 101 of the Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1988 (GAD-PTR Act of 1988). The language of §
505(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(IV) (21 USC § 355; referenced in PTR Act of 1984) is identical
to the language of § 512(b)(n)(1)(H)(i)-(iv) (21 USC § 360(b); referenced in GAD-
PTR Act of 1988).
The GAD-PTR Act of 1988 amends 35 USC § 156 (f):
(1) by striking "human" in paragraph (A) and by amending paragraph (2)
to read as follows:
The term 'drug product' means the active ingredient of-
(A) a new drug, antibiotic drug, or human biological product (as those
term are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act), or
(B) a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms
are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Virus-
Serum-Toxin Act) which is not primarily manufactured using recom-
binant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other proc-
ess involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques, including
any salt or ester of the active ingredient, as a single entity or in
combination with another active ingredient." 35 USC § 156(f).
For amendments to 35 USC § 271(e)(1) see supra note 57.
oo Subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court, Medtronic Inc. sought to
have the injunction issued by the district court vacated. On August 17, 1990 the
CAFC vacated the injunction against Medtronics holding that "no permanent
injunction may be granted unless and until a judgment of infringement is entered
following consideration of the asserted [exemption] to infringement under
271(e)(1)." Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 915 F.2d 670, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1990).101 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2683, 2691, n. 6 (1990).
102 Id.
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view of what the statute means." In other words, it is not essential for a
product to be eligible for patent term extension under § 201 (35 USC §
156) to be eligible for the infringement exemption under § 202 (35 USC
§ 271(e)(1)).
The Court thus appears to state a product-correlation argument and
simultaneously holds that such correlation is not essential. For example,
the Court states that "when, without adding 'new infant formula' to the
defined products eligible for patent-term extension under § 156 [section
201], Congress established a premarket approval requirement for that
product, and thus [Congress] automatically rendered it eligible for the
§ 271(e)(1) [section 202] exemption from patent infringement."13 The
Court apparently is suggesting that any product which requires premar-
keting approval is eligible for the § 271(e)(1) infringement exemption
regardless of whether that product is eligible for patent term extension
under § 201 (35 USC § 156).
One can attempt to justify the Court's reasoning and decision on public
policy grounds (See III. B. Judiciary Committee Report - Public Policy
Considerations, supra) to expand the coverage of under section 202 of 35
USC § 271(e)(1) to products not specifically eligible for patent term ex-
tension under section 201 (35 USC § 156) but which may, in the future,
require extensive premarketing approval as was done with 'infant for-
mula.' Some possible candidate products that may become eligible for
patent turn exemption under 35 USC § 271(e)(1) in the near future are
cosmetics, pesticides, food and vitamins under the Court's current deci-
sion.10 4 Currently these products need only meet "generally applicable
standards"105 as set forth by the FDCA. "See, e.g., 21 USC § 341 (food);
§ 361 (cosmetics); § 346a (pesticides); cf. § 350 (vitamins).' 0 6
Regardless of its reasoning, the Supreme Court has expanded the cov-
erage of 35 USC § 271(e)(1) with an open door for coverage of products
which require extensive premarketing approval. The Court appears to be
signaling a wider coverage of 35 USC § 271(e)(1) than was originally
intended by Congress. One may conclude that any time a patented product
must undergo extensive premarketing approval procedures mandated by
a Federal law then that product is covered by the patent infringement
exemption of 35 USC § 271(e)(1).
In summary, when one submits an ANDA prior to the expiration of the
relevant patent as allowed under § 101 of the PTR Act of 1984 (§
505(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III); 21 USC § 355) it would be improper to hold such a
submission violative of another law, namely, 35 USC § 271(a). In essence
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
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we would have one law that permits submission of an ANDA prior to the
expiration of the pioneer drug patent and another law which holds activities
necessary for the submission of the ANDA to be simultaneously violative
of 35 USC § 271(a). If the provision of the PTR Act of 1984 permitting the
submission of an ANDA prior to the expiration of the relevant patent is to
have any effect such submission must not be held violative of 35 USC §
271(a). In order that the language of 35 USC § 271(a) does not conflict with
the ANDA provisions of the PTR Act of 1984, it was absolutely necessary
to pass 35 USC § 271(e)(1) which provided a necessary exemption to 35 USC
§ 271(a) especially in light of the Bolar and Pfizer decisions which held
activities similar to those of filing an ANDA during the term of the patent
to be violative of 35 USC § 271(a).
Congress reasonably passed 35 USC § 271(e)(1) to provide the narrow
exemption to 35 USC § 271(a) needed in order to give effect to the ANDA
provisions of the PTR Act of 1984 which apply to drugs and not to medical
devices. Nowhere in the legislative history does it provide that 35 USC
§ 271(e)(1) was meant to apply to medical devices and indeed the intent
of Congress supports the contrary view that 35 USC § 271(e)(1) was meant
to apply only to drugs. However, the Court's decision in Lilly v.
Medtronics107 greatly broadens the scope of the patent term exemption of
35 USC § 271(e)(1) to products beyond drugs to medical devices and a
host of candidate products ranging from cosmetics to pesticides.
Justices Kennedy and White'08 in their dissenting opinion state that
"we do not tell Congress how to express its intent. Instead we discern its
intent by assuming that Congress employs words and phrases in accord-
ance with their ordinary usage."'1 9 The dissenters further state that the
ANDA provisions of the PTR Act of 1984 apply only to drugs, whether
human or veterinary, and not to medical devices, and therefore, hold the
view that 35 USC § 271(e)(1) does not apply to medical devices. The
dissenting justices state that "[a]s petitioner [Lilly] has asserted, man-
ufacturers may test generic versions of patented drugs, but not devices,
under abbreviated procedures. See 21 USC § 355 ()."11 0
AJAY S. PATHAK
107Id.
101 The only dissenters were Justices Kennedy and White. Justice O'Connor
did not participate in the Court's decision. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic Inc.,
110 S. Ct. 2683 (1990).
'01 Id. at 2694. The dissenting opinion is limited to three pages. The opinion
gives several examples of what the dissenters consider "words and phrases in
accordance with their ordinary usage." Id.
"I Id. at 2695. The dissent states that [ANDA] procedures, under 21 USC §
355(j)(7)(B), which state "the requirements of showing the 'bioavailability' (see
supra note 47) of drugs" do not apply to medical devices. Id.
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